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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DIXIE STATE BANK, Successor in 
Interest to the Bank of Iron County, 
a Utah Banking Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, Case No. 870509-CA 
vs. 
LARRY E. KING, an Individual, KING-
SCOTT HERITAGE FOUNDATION, INC., 
LARRY E. KING, P.C., a Utah Professional 
Corporation and JOHN DOES I THROUGH V, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, LARRY E. KING, an Individual 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Plaintiff brought its action below to recover from 
Defendant, Larry E. King, an Individual, the deficiency arising 
from a repossession and sale of a vehicle purchased by a 
professional corporation, the stock of which corporation was 
owned by the said Larry E. King. Jurisdiction of this Court is 
based on Section 78-2a-3 U.C.A. 1954. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether an individual shareholder may be held liable for 
a corporation's debt on the theory that the corporation is the 
"alter ego" of the individual in the absence of any evidence or 
finding by the court that the corporation was used to perpetrate 
a fraud, justify a wrong or defeat justice, 
2. Whether there was any evidence that, or finding by the 
court that, the Larry E. King, P.C., a Utah Professional 
Corporation, was used to perpetrate a fraud, justify a wrong or 
defeat justice, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was tried before the Honorable Robert T. 
Braithwaite, without a jury, on September 23, 1987. There were 
no legal memoranda submitted prior to nor after the trial and at 
the conclusion of the evidence the Court issued its oral decision 
denying Plaintiffs claims against Defendant, King-Scott Heritage 
Foundation and against Defendant Larry E. King, an individual, 
for fraud, for guaranty, for negligent representation and 
omission. 
The Court also granted Plaintiff's claims against the 
professional corporation and against Defendant Larry E. King, an 
individual, on the theory that Larry E. King, an individual, was 
the "alter ego" of the professional corporation. 
The Court entered judgment on October 20, 1987, against both 
the professional corporation and against Larry E. King, an 
individual, for $6,886.19, plus $1,700.00 in attorney's fees for 
a total of $8,586.19 and interest at the rate of 16.25% per 
annum. The "Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law" and 
"Judgment" are attached hereto as Appendix "A". 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Larry E. King Professional Corporation was incorporated 
in Utah in the latter part of 1983 by Larry E. King M.D. (Tr. 
26) . 
The said professional corporation received initial capital 
of some money (under $1,000.00) (R. 26-27), some medical supplies 
and some used medical equipment (R. 37-38). There was no 
evidence as to the value of the medical supplies or the used 
medical equipment nor the exact amount of the cash contributed. 
Plaintiff made no request for information of any kind relating to 
the creation, operation or dissolution of the corporation prior 
to trial (R. 40) and merely called Dr. King as a witness without 
any request that any facts be obtained from the corporate records 
(R. 27, 32-33). 
Dr. King had an attorney and an accountant prepare the 
necessary legal documents to incorporate the professional 
corporation and keep the corporate books (R. 31-32; 46-47; 65-
66). The court found as a fact that the corporation never issued 
stock to the owner of the stock (Para. 6(e) Findings of Fact). 
However, the only evidence on that question was that Dr. King did 
not remember whether or not the stock was actually issued (R. 
27). The professional corporation was dissolved in April 1986 
(R. 27-28). 
On April 22, 1985, the professional corporation made a 
written request for a loan from the predecessor of plaintiff bank 
in the amount of $19,000.00 and advised the bank that at that 
time the corporation had assets of $1,800.00 and liabilities of 
$1,200.00 with no other debt and no litigation pending against it 
(Ex. P-l). Attached to the said request was a copy of the first 
page of the corporate tax return for the period ended 6/30/84. 
This return showed taxable income for that year in the amount of 
$2,581.00 (Ex. P-l attachment). 
The loan to the corporation was approved by the bank (R. 4-
5, 14) and the bank prepared all the necessary documentation for 
making the loan and the papers were executed on May 2, 1985, in 
Plaintiff's office (R. 14). One of the documents prepared by the 
bank was a document entitled "Loan Guaranty Agreement." (Ex. P-
3). The trial court determined that there was conflicting 
evidence as to said guaranty agreement and that plaintiff had not 
sustained its burden of proof to impose personal liability on Dr. 
King as a consequence of said guaranty agreement (Findings Of 
Fact 5(b)). 
The professional corporation failed to repay the loan made 
to it, the bank repossessed the vehicle, sold it and brought suit 
for the deficiency against Larry E. King individually and against 
the professional corporation. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
"The immunity of limited stockholder liability is a 
legislative grant and each instance of judicial disregard of this 
is a direct assault against it. Consequently courts have many 
times reiterated the fact that the remedy is exceptional and will 
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be resorted to only under the most imposing of circumstances." 
(Kavich, Business Organizations S120.05[7]). 
The ultimate issue of whether a corporation is the "alter 
ego" of an individual is a question of law and the trial court7s 
ruling on this question is entitled to no deference. 
The Larry E. King, M.D. P.C. was a corporation, duly created 
and existing pursuant to Utah law when it borrowed money from 
plaintiff bank on May 2, 1985. 
All pertinent facts pertaining to said corporation were made 
known to plaintiff when the loan was applied for and when the 
loan was granted. There was no fraud perpetrated in obtaining 
the loan. There was nothing done or said to mislead plaintiff, 
to justify any wrong or defeat justice. There was, in fact, a 
complete disclosure of the facts pertaining to the existence of 
the corporation, its stockholder and its financial condition. 
For a corporate entity to be the "alter ego" of its 
stockholders two conditions must be met. "First, 'there must be 
such unity of interest and ownership that the separate 
personalities no longer exist.7 Second, 'the observance of 
the corporate form [must] sanction a fraud, promote injustice, 
or [cause] an inequitable result [to] follow7" Municipal Bldg. 
Authority v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1985). 
The statutes governing creation of professional corporations 
require that there be a "unity of interest and ownership" and 
this condition must be satisfied in any validly created 
professional corporation and was the situation in the Larry E. 
King, M.D. P.C. There was nothing in either the court's findings 
nor in the evidence which would justify a conclusion that there 
was any fraud, injustice or wrong committed by the professional 
corporation nor by its stockholder, Larry E. King, Because there 
was no such evidence or finding, one of the necessary elements is 
entirely lacking for this corporation to be the "Alter Ego" of 
its stockholder and the judgment should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THIS APPEAL RAISES ONLY LEGAL ISSUES AND THE TRIAL COURT'S 
RULING IS ENTITLED TO NO DEFERENCE AS TO THE QUESTION OF 
WHETHER THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION SHOULD BE TREATED AS 
THE "ALTER EGO" OF THE STOCKHOLDER SO AS TO IMPOSE PERSONAL 
LIABILITY ON THE STOCKHOLDER FOR THE CORPORATION'S DEBTS. 
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that where the 
question before the trial court raises only legal issues, there 
is no presumption of correctness which generally attaches to 
judgments involving questions of fact. In the recent case of 
Taubert v. Roberts, et, al, 72 Ut. Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1987) the 
Court said: 
"Because this appeal raises only legal issues, we 
give the trial court's ruling no deference. See, e.g., 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) 
(citing Betenson v. Call Auto and Equipment Sales, Inc., 
645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982); Automotive Manufacturers 
Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts, Inc., 596 P.2d 
1033, 1036 (Utah 1979))." 
In Branscum v. Castleberry, 695 S.W.2d 643 (Texas 1985) the 
Texas Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict on the grounds 
that the question of "Alter Ego" is a question of law and should 
not be submitted to the jury. The court said (p. 646): 
"Furthermore, we hold that the ultimate issue of 
whether a corporation is the alter ego of an individual 
or individuals is a question of law and, therefore, 
should not be submitted to the jury. The jury is to 
determine any disputed fact issues and then the court 
should determine whether the facts, as found by the jury, 
rise to the extraordinary level required to justify 
disregarding the corporate entity. Because this 
determination is a complex question of law, it must be 
made by the trial court rather than by lawmen ill-
equipped to resolve such questions." 
II 
FOR A CORPORATION TO BE DISREGARDED AND TO BE HELD TO BE 
THE "ALTER EGO" OF ITS STOCKHOLDERS TWO REQUIREMENTS MUST 
BE MET. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE AS TO ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL 
REQUIREMENTS AND NO FINDING BY THE COURT THAT THERE WERE 
ANY FACTS PERTAINING TO SUCH NECESSARY REQUIREMENT. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Municipal Bldq. Authority v. 
Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1985) stated: 
"...For one corporate entity to be the alter ego of 
another, two requirements must be met. First, "there 
must be such unity of interest and ownership that the 
separate personalities of the corporation[s] ... no 
longer exist." Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan 
Co.., Utah, 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (1979). Second, "the 
observance of the corporate form [must] sanction a fraud, 
promote injustice, or [cause] an inequitable result [to] 
follow." Id.; accord Dockstaker v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 
370, 372-73, 510 P.2d 526, 528 (1973); Gude v. City of 
Lakewood, Colo., 6.36 P.2d 691, 697-98 (1981). 
Clearly the requirement that there be evidence that 
observing the corporate entity would sanction a fraud, promote 
injustice or cause an inequitable result is essential to a 
determination that the corporation's existence should be 
disregarded. There was no evidence of any such facts and clearly 
there was no finding by the court of such facts. 
With regard to the necessity of the Trial Court's findings 
on material issues the Utah Supreme Court in Gardner v. Gardner, 
73 Ut. Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah 1988) stated: 
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"Recently, in Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 
(Utah 1987), we noted: 
'Failure of the trial court to make findings on all 
material issues is reversible error unless the facts in 
the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.7 
Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah). ...The 
finding of facts must show that the court's judgment or 
decree 'follows logically from, and is supported by, the 
evidence.7 Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 
1986). The finding 'should be sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached.7 Rucker, 598 P.2d 1338. See also Mountain 
States Legal Foundation v. Public Service Commission, 63 6 
P.2d 1047, 1051 (Utah 1981).If 
Because there was no evidence and no finding by the Trial 
Court that one of the necessary requirements existed which would 
justify disregarding the corporate entity the judgment should be 
reversed. 
This Court in Colman v. Colman, 67 Ut. Adv. Rep. 7 (Ut. Ct. 
of App. 1987) considered a case involving the question of whether 
a corporate entity should be disregarded and recognized the 
necessity of the two requirements set forth by the Supreme Court 
in the Municipal Bldg. case. In the Colman case there were facts 
which justified the conclusion that recognition of the corporate 
entity would result in injustice. Such facts do not exist in 
this case. 
Ill 
THE LARRY E. KING M.D. P.C. WAS A VALIDLY CREATED, AND 
VALIDLY EXISTING CORPORATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH UTAH LAW 
AT THE TIME THE OBLIGATION TO PLAINTIFF WAS CREATED. 
Plaintiff has not alleged in its complaint and has not 
produced any evidence that the Larry E. King M.D. P.C. was not a 
corporation validly created under Utah law. The only allegation 
regarding validity of the corporation is found in paragraph 40 of 
the complaint in which it is alleged that the corporation is a 
"sham and merely the 'alter ego7 of Defendant King-11 
It is not clear whether plaintiff contests the legal 
existence of the Larry E. King M.D. P.C. or whether it accepts as 
a fact the legal existence of the corporation and only contends 
that the legal existence should be disregarded because of certain 
alleged actions or failures to act of the corporation• 
Two of the findings of fact, 6(b) and (c), relate to the 
capitalization of the company. 
Section 16-10-52 U.C.A 1954 provides in pertinent part that: 
"A corporation shall not transact any business or 
incur any indebtedness...until there has been paid in for 
the issuance of shares consideration of the value of at 
least one thousand dollars.11 
The evidence, produced by plaintiff, was that the 
corporation received money of under $1,000.00 (R. 27), medical 
supplies (R.38) and some used medical equipment (R. 38). There 
was no evidence produced nor asked for regarding the value of the 
supplies or equipment and there was no evidence to support the 
finding that "the corporation never received sufficient capital 
in the first place to satisfy the requirement of Utah law that 
$1,000.00 be placed in capital. ..." (Findings of Fact 6(c)). 
Even if it were true that there was a failure to pay in 
$1,000.00 prior to beginning business the corporate existence 
would not be destroyed. The remedy for such a failure is found 
in Section 16-10-44 U.C.A. 1954 which provides that in the event 
of a failure to pay in one thousand dollars before commencing 
business the directors who assent thereto shall be liable to the 
corporation for such part of the $1,000.00 which was not received 
prior to beginning business. There is no claim by anyone of such 
an obligation. 
Section 16-10-51 U.C.A. provides that upon issuance of the 
certificate of incorporation the corporate existence shall begin 
and the said certificate "shall be conclusive evidence that all 
conditions precedent required of the incorporators have been 
complied with" except for actions by the state to revoke the 
certificate. No such action was ever undertaken by the state. 
In finding of fact 6(e) it is stated that the corporate 
stock of the corporation was not issued to the owners. There is 
no statutory nor other legal requirement that stock be actually 
issued, unless demand is made for certificates by the 
shareholders. The Utah Supreme Court in National Bank of the 
Republic v. Beckstead, 68 U. 421, 250 Pac.1033, 1041 (Utah 1926) 
stated: 
"It is, however, also contended that the 
subscription agreement was breached by the company 
because no stock certificates were delivered to the 
subscribers. No demand was made for the stock 
certificates, and it has frequently been held that it is 
immaterial that stock certificates are not delivered or 
tendered. ..." 
While some of these questions are sometimes considered by 
courts to determine whether there is "such unity of interest and 
ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation[s] 
...no longer exist" (Municipal Bldg. Auth., supra p278) they do 
not justify disregarding the corporate entity absent the use of 
the corporation to sanction fraud, promote injustice or cause an 
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inequitable result. Such questions are not probative of the 
question of fraud, injustice or inequity and do not control the 
determination of that question. 
In the Municipal Bldq. case, supra the court found the 
requirement of unity of interest clearly satisfied (p. 278): 
"...The first of these requirements obviously is 
satisfied here: the interest of the county and the 
Authority are identical; under the Act, a buildinq 
authority must work at the behest of the creating 
governmental unit, U.C.A., 1953, 11-29-3(1) (Supp. 1985); 
and the county commissioners qua commissioners are the 
trustees of the Authority. Id." 
However, the corporate entity was not disregarded because 
there was no fraud, injustice or inequity which arose because of 
the corporate activity. 
IV 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION MUST, ACCORDING TO STATUTE BE 
OWNED AND CONTROLLED BY THE PROFESSIONAL WHO RENDERS 
SERVICE FOR THE CORPORATION BUT THERE IS NO LIABILITY FOR 
NON-PROFESSIONAL SERVICES IMPOSED ON THE SAID 
STOCKHOLDERS. 
The Legislature, iji enacting the professional corporate 
statutes, could have imposed personal liability on stockholders 
of a professional corporation for non-professional activities, as 
three states have done. (See Kavich, Business Organizations, 
S82.03[l]). However, Utah did not elect to impose such liability 
on stockholders of professional corporations. Section 16-11-5 
U.C.A. 1953 provides as follows: 
"Application Of Utah Business Corporation Act— 
Conflicts.—The Utah Business Corporation Act shall be 
applicable to professional corporations, and they shall 
enjoy the powers and privileges and be subject to the 
duties, restriction and liabilities of other 
corporations, except where inconsistent with this act. 
This act shall take precedence in the event of any 
conflict with provisions of the Utah Business Corporation Act 
or other laws," 
In the case of We7re Assoc. Co. v. Cohen, et al, 480 NE 2d 
357 (N.Y. 1985) the Court of Appeals of New York held that 
stockholders of a professional service corporation are not liable 
for the ordinary business debts of the corporation. The court 
said (p. 1275): 
"Our decision should work no injustice on those who 
enter into leases or any other contracts with 
professional service corporations, who are free to seek 
the personal assurances of the shareholders that the 
commitments of the professional service corporation will 
be honored. Nor do we intend to countenance any abuse of 
the corporate form of doing business, which, if present 
in a future case, could compel a different result (cf. 
Walkovszky v. Carlton, supra). What we do hold is that, 
absent any showing of such abuse, the shareholders of a 
professional service corporation cannot be held 
personally liable for an ordinary business debt of the 
corporation. ..." 
The Utah Professional Corporation Act Sections 16-11-8 
U.C.A. 1953 requires that no person, other than the professional 
act as officer, director or shareholder of the corporation, 
except a non-licensed person may serve as secretary or treasurer. 
Section 16-11-4(3) U.C. A. 1953 provides that "if a 
corporation has only one shareholder, the board may consist of 
that shareholder." 
It appears that the requirement of a unity of interest 
between any professional corporation and its stockholders must 
exist or the corporation would not satisfy the legal requirements 
established by the legislature to create such professional 
corporation. 
Unless there is some fraud, injustice or inequity which 
results from the corporate activity the corporate entity will not 
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be disregarded because of the unity of interest between the 
corporation and its stockholders. 
The Larry E. King, P.C., a Utah professional corporation 
made a complete disclosure of all pertinent information to 
plaintiff prior to the preparation of the contract documents by 
the plaintiff and execution thereof by the officers of the 
professional corporation. Exhibit P-l was presented to plaintiff 
at the time the loan was applied for and it clearly states that 
the corporate assets were $1,800.00, the liabilities were 
$1,200.00 and the net taxable income for the prior year was 
$2,581.00. This is not a case where the plaintiff was misled by 
false information. All the facts, on which the trial court 
relied in disregarding the corporate entity were fully disclosed 
prior to the loan being approved. 
In the case of Savage v. Royal Properties, Inc., 417 P.2d 
925 (Ariz. 1966) the Court of Appeals of Arizona considered a 
case where the plaintiff contended that a corporate entity should 
be disregarded "where one corporation is so organized and 
controlled, and its affairs are so conducted that it is, in fact, 
a mere instrumentality or adjunct of another corporation11 (p. 
927). The Arizona court refused to disregard the corporate 
entity where the plaintiff was aware of the facts pertaining to 
the relationship between the parties. The court quoted the 
following from a Michigan case (p. 927): 
11
'A claimant of the subsidiary corporation cannot be 
said to have been affected by the parent's use of the 
subsidiary as a mere instrumentality, if with knowledge 
of all the facts at the time he entered into the 
transaction with the subsidiary, he accepted or approved 
the relationship between the two corporations.'" 
V 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE PARTY MAKING THE CLAIM. IN 
THIS CASE THERE WAS NO CLAIM, NO EVIDENCE AND NO FINDING 
WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY A CONCLUSION THAT THE CORPORATION WAS 
UTILIZED TO SANCTION FRAUD, PROMOTE INJUSTICE OR CAUSE AN 
INEQUITABLE RESULT AND THAT THE CORPORATION SHOULD 
THEREFORE BE DISREGARDED AS AN ENTITY. 
The Utah Jury Instruction Forms clearly state the basic law 
regarding burden of proof as follows (1.10). 
"...the burden of proving any disputed fact rests upon 
the party claiming that fact to be true..." 
Kavich, Business Operations S120.05[7] states: 
"The person who asserts the applicability of the alter-ego 
theory has the burden of proving that the corporation does 
not have a separate and distinct identity." 
Plaintiff alleged in its complaint that the professional 
corporation was a closely held one-man corporation (parag. 3 6), 
that defendant King is an officer and stockholder thereof (parag. 
37), that defendant King controls the activities of the 
corporation for his own benefit and therefore the corporation's 
acts are the personal acts of defendant King (parag. 38). 
Plaintiff also alleged that King had defrauded Plaintiff by 
altering loan documents (parag. 39) but the Trial Court held the 
evidence insufficient to justify this claim and the question of 
altering loan documents is not an issue on this appeal. 
Based on the above allegations of fact, Plaintiff alleged 
the legal conclusion that the professional corporation was the 
"alter ego" of defendant King. 
None of these allegations, assuming them all to be true, 
would justify a conclusion that the corporation was used to 
sanction fraud, promote injustice or cause an inequitable result. 
Also, the Trial Court's finding of fact do not even purport 
to establish fraud, injustice or inequity. The Trial Court found 
certain facts, some of which have no support in the evidence, but 
none of which, even if true, would justify a conclusion that 
fraud, injustice or inequity was involved in the corporation's 
activities. A summary of the Trial Court's findings and 
Defendant's comments thereon follow: 
a. Dr. King had difficulty identifying contracts which 
generated corporate income. 
The evidence on this point was that Dr. King was 
attempting to obtain written contracts, was not 
successful in large part because the other party to the 
agreement ran out of funds and could not continue (Record 
52-55) . 
b. The corporation was undercapitalized. 
There is no evidence as to what capital was required. 
There is no legal requirement regarding the amount of 
capital, except as to initial capital. In any event the 
actual capital of the corporation was fully disclosed 
before the loan was approved (Exhibit P-l). 
c. The $1,000.00 required by Utah law was not paid in. 
The evidence was that cash, supplies and equipment 
were paid in to the corporation (Record 26-27, 37-38). 
The plaintiff, which had the burden of proof, produced no 
evidence whatever as to the actual amount of money, the 
value of the supplies or of the equipment. Certainly 
there was no evidence to show that less than $1,000.00 
was paid in. Even if less than $1,000.00 had been paid 
in, such fact does not disenfranchise the corporation. 
The remedy for such a situation is covered by Section 16-
10-44 U.C.A. 1954 which provides for payment of any 
deficiency in the initial capital by the directors. 
d. That some corporation property—the vehicle owned by 
the corporation, was used by the corporate officer for 
personal purposes. 
Many corporations make vehicles available to 
corporate employees for business and personal use. No 
case and no statute has been found which makes such use 
either illegal or a fraud on corporate creditors. 
e. Corporate stock was not issued. 
The law does not require that corporate stock be 
issued, unless it is requested. There was no evidence 
that the stock was not issued, only that Dr. King did not 
remember whether or not it was issued (Record 27) . The 
burden of proving this fact was Plaintiff's and the 
evidence produced proved nothing. In any event, it is 
immaterial whether or not the stock was actually issued. 
f. Larry King controlled the corporation and he took 
money out and put it in at his will. 
Clearly Larry King controlled the corporation. The 
law requires that the professional and only the 
professional own the stock and act as officer and 
director. 
The only evidence regarding taking money out or 
putting it in the corporation was plaintiff's counsel's 
statement that "So you basically took money whenever you 
wanted it, essentially, right?" (Record p. 42). Dr. 
King's reply to this statement was that he could only 
take money when there was some available. This is a fact 
of life applicable to everyone and only shows that there 
was insufficient income to pay Dr. King his compensation 
on a regular basis. 
g. The corporation was voluntarily dissolved at the time 
when the last payments were made on the corporation's 
note to plaintiff. 
The evidence was that the corporation was dissolved 
because the corporation had obligations to the Internal 
Revenue Service which it could not pay and if the Revenue 
Service required payment there would be nothing left to 
pay Dr. King to live on (Record pp. 49-50). A 
substantial amount of money would be required to do the 
legal work to update the corporation's pension profit 
sharing plan, which money the corporation did not have 
(Record p. 51). Also, the corporation was dissolved 
because its sources of income had terminated. (Record pp. 
52-55). 
There was no evidence that the corporation was 
terminated in order to avoid the obligation to plaintiff. 
None of these findings, no evidence in the case and no 
allegation in the complaint purport to establish that the 
professional corporation in this case was ever used to perpetrate 
a fraud, justify a wrong or defeat justice. In the absence of 
such facts the corporate existence may not be disregarded on the 
theory of "alter ego" and by so doing impose personal liability 
on the corporation's stockholder. 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Spencer & Anderson 
By: 
fele E.Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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Mailed four copies of the foregoing "Brief Of Appellant, 
Larry E. King, an Individual" this tf~K_. day of / ^ g ^ O / , 
1988, by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Russell J. Gallian, Esq, 
1 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 367 
St. George, Utah 8477 0 
Dale E. Arfderson 
i ° 
GALLIAN & WESTFALL 
RUSSELL J. GALLIAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET 
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING 
P. 0. Box 367 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
(801) 628-1682 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IRON COUNTY, CEDAR CITY DEPARTMENT 
DIXIE STATE BANK, Successor in 
Interest to BANK OF IRON COUNTY, 
a Utah Banking Corporation, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
LARRY E. KING an Individual, 
KING-SCOTT HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 
INC., LARRY E. KING, P.C., a 
Utah Professional Corporation and 
JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 87-CV-029 
The matter having come before the above entitled Court for 
trial, and the Court having considered the evidence by both the 
Plaintiff and Defendant and the argument of counsel and good cause 
appearing therefore, and the Court having entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court therefore renders the 
following Judgment: 
1. Plaintiff shall have iudqment aaainst the Defendant Larry 
E. King on the Third Cause of Action of the Complaint in the amount 
of $6,886.19, together with attorney's fees of $1,700.00 for a total 
R12/19 
judgment of $8,586.19, which judgment shall hereafter bear interest 
at the rate of 16.25% per annum until paid. 
2. That the Plaintiff is awarded judgment aqainst the 
Defendant Larry E. King, M.D.,P.C. in the amount of $6,886.19, 
together with atorney's fees in the amount of $1,700.00 in a total 
judgment of $8,586.19 to hereinafter bear interest at the rate of 
16.25% per annum until paid. 
3. That the First and Second Causes of Action against the 
Defendant Larry E. King are hereby dismissed with prejudice and on 
the merits. 
4. That the Complaint against the King Scott-Heritage 
Foundation is hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
5. No court costs are awarded except as already included in 
the Judgment above. 
ENTERED this day of , 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
Circuit Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings <&f Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid, 
this '. -ft*, day of Jv^f* , 1987, to the following: 
Dale E. Anderson, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants 
Spencer & Anderson 
P.O. Box 22103 AMF 
1973 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84122 
-2-
GALLIAN & WESTFALL 
RUSSELL J. GALLIAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET 
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING 
P. 0. Box 3^ 7 
ST. - GEORGE", UTAH 84770 
(801) 628-1682 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IRON COUNTY, CEDAR CITY DEPARTMENT 
DIXIE STATE BANK, Successor in ) 
Interest to the BANK OF IRON 
COUNTY, a Utah Banking ) 
Corporation, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff 
vs. ) 
LARRY E. KING an Individual, ) 
KING-SCOTT HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 
INC., LARRY E. KING, P.C., a ) 
Utah Professional Corporation and Civil No. 87-CV-029 
JOHN DOES I through V, ) 
Defendants ) 
The matter having come before the above entitled Court for 
trial, and the Court having considered the evidence by both the 
Plaintiff and Defendant and the argument of counsel and good cause 
appearing therefore, the Court enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. As to the First Cause of Action the Court finds that the 
Note and related documents were signed by Larry E. King, M.D.,P.C, 
R12/18 
and that said corporation, which has been voluntarily dissolved is 
liable for the amount due and owing to the Bank of IiQn County* 
2* The parties have stipulated that the real pqrty in interest 
in the case is Dixie State Bank who has assumed tho assets of the 
Bank of Iron Co.unty. 
3. The proper amount due and owing under the complaint as of 
the date of trial is $6,886.19, and said note bore interest at the 
rate of 16.25% per annum until paid. 
4. That the Plaintiff's attorney, Russell J. Gallian of the 
firm of Gallian & Westfall, incurred additional attorney»s fees of 
$1,700.00 which are properly assessable to the case, no court costs 
were requested other than those included in the computation of the 
amount due under the note for monies advanced to pri*>r counsel. 
5. With respect to the personal guaranty that
 o n its face was 
signed by Larry E. King, M.D.,P.C. by Larry E. King^ President, the 
Court finds the following: 
a. That the document was presented to Lqrry E. King for 
his personal guarantee. 
b. The Court finds that there is a diinCt conflict of 
testimony as to whether or not the Bank of Iron (
 ()unty was aware 
that Larry E. King did not intend to sign personal iy# Under these 
circumstances the Court finds that the Plaintiff hab
 not carried its 
burden as to Dr. King's liability under the personal guaranty, which 
had been altered by Dr. King. Accordingly, the c
 f)Urt also finds 
that the Plaintiff has also not met its burden of ptf)0f on its claim 
for negligent misrepresentation. 
6. With respect to the alter ego theory presented by the 
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Plaintiff, the Court finds the following: 
a. That the Defendant Dr. Larry E. King generally 
speaking was unable to distinguish between himself and his 
corporation with respect to contracts which generated income for the 
corporation. 
b. That the corporation was undercapitalized. 
c. That the corporation never received sufficient 
capital in the first place to satisfy the requirement of Utah law 
that $1,000.00 be placed in capital in the corporation prior to 
commencing business. 
d. That there was some of the corporate property used for 
personal purposes, including specifically the, ««tomobile which was 
pledged as to security for the loans which are the subject matter of 
this lawsuit. 
e. That the corporate stock of the corporation was never 
issued to the owners thereof (Larry King). 
f. That the corporation was fully controlled by the 
Defendant Larry E. King, and that said Defendant took money out and 
put income in at his will. 
g. That the corporation was voluntarily dissolved by the 
Defendant close in time to the last timely payments being made under 
the note which is the subject matter of this lawsuit, and that at 
that time the Defendant Larry E. King withdrew his income earninc 
ability as a physician from his professional corporation. 
h. That Larry E. King M.D.,P.C. was the alter ego of 
Defendant Larry E. King. 
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7. The Court finds that the King-Scott Heritage Foundation, a 
named Defendant herein, had executed the chattel mortgage for the 
vehicle which was the security for the loans provided for, but that 
said Defendant did not execute any of the documents and is therefore 
not liable. Based upon a Stipulation by the Plaintiff, the 
Complaint against said defendant should be dismissed. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court enters the 
following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Plaintiff has not met his burden as to the First 
and Second Cause of the action and with respect to the same the 
Court finds no cause of action against the individual Defendant 
Larry E. King, either on the theory of liability under the guaranty 
or by virtue of negligent misrepresentation. 
2. That the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Larry E. 
King, M.D. ,P.C. in the amount of $6,886.19, plus $1,700.00 in 
attorney's fees for a total judgment of $8,586.19. That said 
judgment shall hereafter bear interest at the rate of 16.25% per 
annum. 
3. The Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the Defendant 
Larry E. King by virtue of the fact that it is established that the 
Larry E. King, M.D.P.C. was the alter ego of the individual defendant 
Larry E. King, and that the Plaintiff is therefore entitled to 
judgment against the Defendant in the amount of $6,886.19, together 
with attorney's fees in the amount of $1,700.00 for a total of 
$8,586.19, together with interest from the date of judgment in the 
amount of 16.25% per annum. 
4. The Court having found no basis tor" further claim against 
King-Scott Heritage Foundation, and based upon the Stipulation of 
the Plaintiff, the Complaint against the King-Scott Heritage 
Foundation should be dismissed. 
DATED this j/Pj^ daY o f ^MLIDJ^JC. _ * 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
Circuit Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true arid correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings 6f Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid, 
this 3$^ day of JUki/- # 1987, to the following: 
Dale E. Anderson, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants 
Spencer & Anderson 
P.O. Box 22103 AMF 
1973 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84122 
